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In this paper, I analyse a controversy that is taking place within the (relatively young) discipline of 
International Political Economy (IPE). This very lively controversy was triggered by a paper of 
Benjamin J. Cohen (2007), which offers us a way of slicing up the field (a dichotomy of American 
versus British approaches to IPE) as well as a proposal for the future development of IPE as an 
academic discipline. The many reactions this paper provoked (more than 20 articles in journals up to 
now), provide us with an exceptionally clear insight into the self-understanding of a discipline, and in 
particular into issues of (un)desired pluralism, heterodoxy, synthesis, dialogue, mainstream, etc. (see, 
for instance, Helleiner, 2009; McNamara, 2009; Palan, 2009; Phillips, 2009). 
 
The importance for philosophers of social science of undertaking such a case-study is threefold. First, 
the analysis of the controversy will clarify what social scientists themselves consider as the ideal 
approach towards the multiplicity of approaches in their field (‘schools’, theories, models, research 
programs, …); is it coexistence, some form of interaction, or a synthesis of competing approaches?  
And, how would they translate that ideal into practice? Second, this case-study helps us to test and 
further our philosophies of social science, in particular in relation to the issue of scientific pluralism – 
different understandings of (the ideal of) scientific pluralism can be made explicit in the contributions of 
participants to the IPE-discussion. These understandings are compared with philosophical accounts of 
scientific pluralism (cf., e.g., Longino, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Van Bouwel, 2009a and 2009b). Through 
this comparison, we evaluate the philosophical accounts and make the IPE-contributions more explicit. 
Which brings us to the third point; the feedback into the social science. Some contributions to the IPE-
controversy might benefit from philosophical explications (as concerns the problems of, for instance, 
conceptual exclusion, strategic pluralism, hermeneutic injustice, consensus/synthesis, etc.). Thus, the 
relevance of philosophical accounts for the practice of social science will be demonstrated by showing 
how they help making the intuitions of IPE-scholars present in their contributions more explicit, 
improve the self-understanding of the field and enable the elaboration of better legitimations of visions 
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